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Abstract
When consumers do not only care for the intrinsic consumption component of commodities but also
for the value of a commodity, it can be rational to purchase products as they become more expensive.
Standard revealed preference conditions are however unable to take diamond effects into account. We
develop a theoretical model and the associated revealed preference conditions to analyze commodities
with different degrees of diamondness. On the basis of real consumer data from the Russian Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey, we test the empirical performance of different models with and without diamond
effects. It turns out that allowing for diamond effects improves the predictive success of the models. We
also link the newly identiĕed diamondness weights to the visibility of commodities. e results suggest
that visible goods are more likely to induce diamond effects.
JEL Classiĕcation: C18, D03, D11, D12
Keywords: revealed preferences; diamond effects; price-dependent preferences
1 Introduction
Diamond effects e standard (micro)economic literature assumes that consumers derive utility from the
quantities they consume. Quantity is perceived as a primary source of utility. However, it has already been
recognized that prices can also impact on the utility of consumers. Ng (1987 and 1993) argues that, some-
times, something is purchased for its value rather than for its intrinsic consumption effect. Jewellery is prob-
ably the most intuitive example. A diamond is not always purchased for its size. Its value may be more
important, as a means to please a beloved one. Similarly, an art collection is valued for its value rather than
the number of pieces in this collection (Mandel, 2009). More generally, there are various (visible) goods
which can have some degree of diamondness. Whenever people treat their friends to a dinner, go shopping
in expensive clothing stores or acquire some collection of wines or cigars, it is not unthinkable that these
people care for the value of their purchase.
Analyzing the rationality of consumers in the presence of diamond goods, and studying the nature of
different consumer goods, is of major importance. In fact, Ng (1987) presents a parametric framework to
test the (welfare) effects of the taxation of diamond goods. Taxing these goods increases government rev-
enue without imposing an overly large burden on consumers, for their utility increases with the price of the
diamond goods.
*I thank Laurens Cherchye and omas Demuynck for many useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I also thank
Bram De Rock and Frederic Vermeulen for their help related to the RLMS data. Finally, my thanks go to Frederic Vermeulen and
seminar participants in Leuven for valuable suggestions.
†Center for Economic Studies, University of Leuven, E. Sabbelaan 53, B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium, email: sam.cosaert@kuleuven-
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For this reason, it is important to identify which commodities are standard goods and which are diamond
goods. Up to now, little empirical research has been conducted to identify the diamondness of consumption
goods while using the criterion of ‘rational decision making’. However, Mandel (2009) built on the model of
Ng (1987) to analyze situations where the price of art work is included in the utility function of consumers.
Based on data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, we illustrate that allowing for diamond
effects has a considerable impact on the empirical performance of the revealed preference characterizations.
Moreover, we introduce a measure for the diamondness of various commodities, and test the empirical per-
formance for different values of this measure. We also link the constructed diamondness weights to the
visibility of the commodities (based on the visibility ranking in Heffetz, 2011).
Revealed preference Revealed preference models, in the tradition of Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967),
Diewert (1973) andVarian (1982), consist of a number of conditions that need to hold in order for a consumer
to be rational. e conditions are derived from a ĕnite set of observables: price and quantity information
at different points in time. Under the assumption of preference homogeneity over time, revealed preference
theory allows for testing the transitivity of preference relations, without imposing a functional form on the
utility functions. Another attractive feature of this methodology is that consumption decisions of different
agents can be analyzed independently, thereby fully recognizing that different agents can have different tastes.
In this paper, we argue that letting preferences depend on both quantities and prices does not auto-
matically preclude the decent deĕnition of a revealed preference test. However, we need to modify the test.
Standard revealed preference conditions are unable to take diamond effects into account. Individuals are typ-
ically assumed to care for quantity (or at least for intrinsic characteristics of the good1) but not for the total
value of a purchase. Failure to model diamond effects can lead to incorrect conclusions on the rationality of
consumers. Consumers’ choices which seem irrational according to the standard test may be rationalizable
if diamond effects are taken into account, and vice versa. Until now, revealed preference theory for diamond
goods is non-existent.
Unfortunately, the theory of revealed preferences and the conjecture that preferences depend on value or
prices are difficult to reconcile (see e.g. recent contributions by Bilancini, 2011 and Frank and Nagler, 2012).
Revealed preference theory requires a ĕnite data set of consumption choices under different price regimes
while maintaining a constant preference ordering. If the preference ordering itself is inĘuenced by prices,
revealed preference theory becomes useless because we can not make comparisons of different consumption
bundles over time. In the speciĕc case of diamond effects, prices only enter the utility function through
total expenditures on some commodity. Hence a homogeneous preference ordering can be deĕned over the
different values of the goods. Yet, if the prices in the utility function (the ‘normal’ prices) co-move with the
prices in the budget constraint (the ‘market’ prices), the theory of revealed preference loses all of its testable
implications, even in our framework.
However, with the distinction between normal andmarket prices, Pollak (1977) provides a basis for com-
bining the price-dependent preferences on the one hand and the revealed preference logic on the other hand.
Speciĕcally, if the normal and market prices do not exactly coincide (or co-move) for all observed commodi-
ties, revealed preference theory maintains its testable implications. Of course, the more both prices coincide,
the less testable become our models. To test the empirical performance of the different speciĕcations, we use
measures which are standard in the revealed preference literature.
Related literature We have argued that the preferences adopted in our framework are a speciĕc case of
price-dependent preferences. Prices enter the utility function of consumers, but only through their effect on
the value of a purchase. Price-dependent preferences are more general, however, and can be used in vari-
1Blow, Browning and Crawford (2005) provide a revealed preference analysis of characteristics models.
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ous circumstances2. First of all, several studies (dating back to Scitovsky, 1945) discuss quality effects. When
consumers are satisĕed in terms of consumed quantities, they can improve utility by buying themore sophisti-
cated items. Prices then help to identify the products of high quality3. Second, Veblen (1899) pointed out that
consumption is also driven by status effects. Owning highly priced consumption goods signals consumers’
ability to purchase expensive goods, and hence, the wealth of the consumer. Conspicuous consumption in-
dicates that consumers buy the more expensive commodities to ‘show off ’4.
In this respect, it is also interesting to report two empirical studies which do not exactly cover diamond ef-
fects but which implicitly or explicitly focus on consumption choices when preferences are allowed to depend
on the value or price of commodities.
Scott and Yelowitz (2010) focus on one commodity in particular: diamonds. e authors compare the
marginal willingness to pay for diamonds with the price which is justiĕed on the basis of the mere quality of
the diamonds. It is found that consumers are willing to pay 18% more for a diamond of one-half carat than
for a diamond which is only slightly less than one-half carat, for instance. e authors explain this anomaly
by arguing that offering a diamond of one-half carat to someone creates a totally different perception than
offering a diamond of 0.499 carat. People care about the value of the diamond.
Because we investigate different commodity groups rather than focusing on one commodity in particu-
lar, and because we build our analysis on a structural model of consumer behaviour, our research is closer
related to a study by Basmann, Molina and Slottje (1988). Basmann, Molina, and Slottje (1988) assume that
consumers maximize a generalized Fechner-urstone type utility function subject to a classical budget con-
straint. While maintaining rationality as a test criterion, the authors allow for price-dependent preferences.
eir empirical application uses consumer data on 5 commodity groups (food, clothing, housing, durables
and medical care) to test Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption. Although related, our study is differ-
ent in at least two ways. First, we use information on the consumption of 14 different commodies (including
luxuries) to investigate diamond effects (rather than pure status effects). erefore, prices only enter the
utility function because of their effect on the total value of a purchase. Second, and more importantly, our
nonparametric approach imposes minimal structure on the utility functions of consumers.
Contribution e contribution of this paper is three-fold.
On the theoretical level, we present an empirically tractablemodel of individual rationality in the presence
of diamond effects. is model is more general than the existing model of utility maximization over quanti-
ties and more general than the models of Ng (1987 and 1993), which value one particular diamond good at
market prices. We make a distinction between models with pure diamond effects (based on Ng, 1987) and
models with mixed diamond effects (based on Ng, 1993). While the former is more powerful (see infra) the
latter may be more realistic (utility can be derived both from the intrinsic consumption and from the market
2Pollak (1977) provides an insightful overview of the modelling of price-dependent preferences. e author considers two dis-
tinct ways in which price-dependent preferences are analyzed: the unconditional approach and the conditional approach. According
to the unconditional approach, economic agents express their preferences, not only over quantities, but over price-quantity pairs (see
e.g. Kalman, 1968 and Piccione and Rubinstein, 2008). In this case, welfare conclusions are still possible (there exists a homogeneous
preference ordering deĕned over quantities and prices) but the model can not be tested on the basis of data from standard consump-
tion surveys, where people choose quantities and not price-quantity pairs. Because data on choices over price-quantity pairs (at
any moment in time) are generally unavailable, the conditional approach seems most popular in empirical work. Following this ap-
proach, the preference orderings (deĕned over quantities) are conditional on prices. A popular functional speciĕcation for the utility
function - which accounts for preference shiing parameters such as prices - is the generalized Fechner-urstone utility function.
However, this utility function does not allow for welfare comparisons between periods where the preference shiing parameters (i.e.
the prices) take different values.
3Empirical evidence for the relationship between prices and perceived quality is somewhat unclear, though. Zeithaml (1988)
argues that a general positive relationship between price on the one hand and quality on the other hand is not conĕrmed in many
empirical studies.
4However, this only makes sense when prices of status goods are visible to other consumers. Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), for
instance, argue that modelling status through the commodities’ prices alone is rather restrictive.
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value of a commodity). More generally, this paper can be seen as a ĕrst attempt to build a bridge between the
literature on diamond effects on the one hand and the literature on the revealed preference methodology on
the other hand. Instead of just abandoning one of these separate literatures, we develop a way in between, by
using Pollak’s distinction between market prices (prices in the budget constraint) and normal prices (prices
in the utility functions). A new (set of) parameter(s), the so called diamondness weights, captures the re-
sponsiveness of normal prices to current market prices.
On themethodological level, we present the revealed preference characterizations that are associated with
different speciĕcations of our models with (pure andmixed) diamond effects. Each speciĕcation corresponds
to a particular set of values which is imposed on the diamondness weights. By varying the values of these
diamondness weights, we canmove from the classical model of utilitymaximization to amodel wheremarket
prices and normal prices co-move exactly. Interestingly, we can test these different speciĕcations (and hence
the different assumptions on the diamondness weights) by using performance measures which are standard
in revealed preference analysis. Moreover, it turns out that the different speciĕcations of the models with di-
amond effects are generally non-nested. As such, it is not necessarily the case that a data set is consistent with
a model with strictly positive diamondness for some commodities when it is consistent with the predictions
of the classical model, or vice versa. is will be illustrated using two examples in Section 3.
On the empirical level, we show that the revealed preference characterizations provide us with an easy
test for rationality in the presence of diamond effects. In fact, by repeating this test for different values of the
diamondness weight, and by assessing the standard empirical performance measures associated with these
speciĕcations, we can effectively identify the most realistic diamondness weight per commodity. In this way,
our study contributes to the empirical identiĕcation of diamond goods. Furthermore, we investigate the
goodness-of-ĕt of our models, i.e. we compute the largest number of subsequent time periods during which
the consumers have chosen in line with some speciĕcation. e length of this period will be inĘuenced by
the postulated diamondness weights. Finally, we investigate whether the more visible commodities (based on
the visibility ranking in Heffetz, 2011) also obtain higher diamondness weights in our analysis.
Outline In Section 2, we ĕrst provide a discussion of the framework in which diamond effects can be ana-
lyzed. We also discuss the difference between market prices and normal prices, and the relationship between
both concepts. Next, we introduce the formal models with pure and mixed diamond effects, inspired by Ng
(1987 and 1993). In Section 3, we present the revealed preference characterizations that correspond to the
aforementioned models. ese characterizations contain conditions which can be tested using linear pro-
gramming techniques. We discuss our data set from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey in Section
4. Section 5 presents measures for the empirical performance of the revealed preference characterizations,
including pass rates, discriminatory power and predictive success. Our empirical results are presented in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Diamond effects
In this section, we formally present the distinction between market prices (the prices which enter the budget
constraint) and normal prices (the prices which enter the utility function). Before we introduce the models,
we brieĘy discuss the relationship between normal prices and market prices. In Subsection 2.2, the model
with pure diamond effects is presented. Following this model, utility can not be derived both from intrinsic
consumption and from the exactmarket value of some commodity. In themodel withmixed diamond effects,
presented in Subsection 2.3, the intrinsic consumption component and the market value can enter the utility
function simultaneously.
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2.1 Normal price function
Because our focus is on diamond effects, we let the value of commodities enter the utility function of con-
sumers5. e price of some commodity can only affect preferences via the expenditures on this commodity.
erefore, it remains possible to have a homogeneous preference ordering over time U (provided that the
social environment is rather stable and so on), hence welfare comparisons and the revealed preference ap-
proach are still valid. is contrasts with the conditional approach to the (more general) price-dependent
preferences, where preferences are conditional on prices and where prices do not necessarily enter the utility
function via the expenditures. Revealed preference theory is attractive because it imposes minimal structure
on the utility functions, such that we are able to analyze the rationality of each individual separately (and
account for unobserved heterogeneity).
Ng (1987) introduces a model where one good is assumed to be a (pure) diamond good, i.e. the market
value of this commodity enters the utility function of consumers. In a later paper, Ng (1993) also allows
for mixed diamond goods, where both the market value and the intrinsic consumption component of one
(mixed) diamond good enter the utility function. Unfortunately, in the framework of Ng (1987 and 1993),
there is only one pure ormixed diamond good. e other goods are standard goods. In this paper, we present
a framework where, in principle, all goods are allowed to have diamondness, and where diamondness is
expressed on a continuum between 0 and 1 (rather than a framework where goods can only be divided into
2 groups: diamond goods and standard goods). In order to allow for different degrees of diamondness in
this revealed preference framework, wemake use of Pollak’s distinction between normal prices t andmarket
prices Pt. Speciĕcally, consumers are now assumed to optimize
max
Q
U(tQ)
by choosing optimal levels ofQ. e normal prices t can, but in general must not, be equal to the current
market prices Pt. In fact, the way in which normal prices depend on market prices is of major importance.
As argued by Pollak (1977) and acknowledged by Frank andNagler (2012), revealed preference theory is only
useful whenever the normal prices andmarket prices vary independently of one another. Otherwise stated, if
the normal andmarket prices coincide exactly, the revealed preference models lose testability. In this speciĕc
case, where prices enter the utility function as a factor of quantities, equality of normal and market prices
would suggest that the preference ranking of bundles can be constructed in line with total expenditures: more
expensive bundles would always be better. Hence, contradictions and rejections of the revealed preference
conditions would not occur, and consumers’ choices would always be trivially rationalizable.
In the following, we specify the way in which normal prices depend on market prices, i.e. the normal
price function (Pollak, 1977). Pollak (1977) describes an appealing special case of this normal price function,
in which normal prices are a weighted average of all market prices. In our framework, a natural choice is to
specify the normal price function as a weighted average of the current market price and a past reference price
index6.
8n 2 N : n0t = n  Pnt + (1  n)  Pnreference
is function satisĕes the nonnegativity and homogeneity (of degree one) assumptions in Pollak (1977).
Furthermore, for positive values of n, the normal prices n0t and the market prices Pnt converge towards
the same conĕguration. e n parameters will be called diamondness weights for the remainder of this
study. Imposing this structure on the normal price function is useful for a number of reasons. First of all,
5Other studies where prices enter the utility function as a factor of quantities include Ng (1987 and 1993), Weber (2002), Deng
and Ng (2004), Mandel (2009) and Engström (2011).
6In Appendix B, we show that our resuls can easily incorporate amore general normal price function. However, this more general
function increases the number of coefficients to be estimated, and it makes the interpretation of the coefficients more difficult.
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this normal price function makes it possible to distinguish clearly between situations where market prices
and normal prices coincide and situations where market prices and normal prices vary independently. Sec-
ond, the ĕnal speciĕcation of the normal price function will depend on the choice of certain (diamondness)
parameters. Interestingly, by deriving the revealed preference characterizations for different values of the
underlying parameters, we are effectively able to test each speciĕcation of the normal price function that we
consider.
An interesting interpretation is obtained when the normal prices are deĘated by Pnreference in all periods.
First of all, this transformation has no effect on the revealed preference outcomes (remember that the util-
ity function remains unspeciĕed; it is only assumed to be homogeneous across periods). Multiplying some
argument in the utility function by a constant scalar in all waves does not change the revealed preference re-
strictions. One should just bear in mind that all market prices are now expressed in relation to this reference
index. In our study, we choose the market prices in the ĕrst wave as the reference prices, Pnreference = Pn1 .
Second, it provides us with a normalized price indexP 0nt =
Pnt
Pn1
;whichmight bemore realistic, as consumers
may evalute price changes in proportion to an earlier price (in this case Pn1 ) of the same good7.
8n 2 N : nt = n  P 0nt + (1  n)  1
In some sense, the diamondness weights capture the responsiveness of the normal prices to changes in
the (normalized) market prices. Indeed, if P 0nt is raised by 1, the normal price increases by n. If n = 1, this
implies that normal prices co-move with (normalized) market prices one-to-one. If n = 0, then the normal
prices are independent of the (normalized) market prices. en the above maximization problem reduces to
the classical model with standard goods:
max
Q
U(Q)
In this case, the observed demands should satisfy the standard properties of negative semi-deĕniteness
and symmetry of the Slutsky matrix. If, on the other hand, n > 0, then the implied substitution matrix
need no longer be negative semi-deĕnite or symmetric (note that symmetry and negative semi-deĕniteness
are oen rejected in empirical tests of the standard unitary model). When all normal prices and (current)
market prices co-move exactly (n = 1; 8n 2 N ), we have the so called simultaneous speciĕcation. In this
case, our models lose testability (Bilancini, 2011 and Frank and Nagler, 2012).
2.2 Model with pure diamond effects
Suppose that we have a data setS = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tgwhich consists ofT observations. For each observation
t, this data set contains information on the observed quantity vectorQt 2 RjN j+ and the corresponding price
vector Pt 2 RjN j++. e prices denoted by P0t =
Pt
P1
are the normalized current market prices.
e variable t is the vector of prices that enter the utility function. As such, utility is not derived from the
observed consumption quantities per se, it is derived from the value associated with consuming Qt at prices
Pt, namely tQt. Finally, nt is deĕned as the weighted average of the (normalized) current market price P 0nt
and one. e diamondness weights n can take any value between 0 and 1.
Problem 1 Optimization problem  PDE
max
Q
U(tQ)
7Suppose that shoes cost 5 tokens and jackets cost 10 tokens in period 1, and shoes cost 6 tokens and jackets 9 tokens in period
2. e normalized price index associated with shoes will be higher than the same price index associated with jackets, in period 2.
Indeed, shoes have become more expensive.
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s:t:
PtQ  yt
8n 2 N : nt = n  P 0nt + (1  n)  1
Revealed preference theory then proceeds by looking for some utility function U such that the observed
consumption pattern solves Problem 1.
Deĕnition 2 Consider a data setS = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg:We say thatS is rationalizable with pure  diamond
effects if there exists a utility function U deĕned over values Q such that fQt; 8t 2 Tg solves optimization
problem  PDE.
It is easily seen that rationalizability with pure  diamond effects comprises rationalizability by a stan-
dard utility function, rationalizability by a utility function followingNg (1987) and rationalizability by a utility
function which is non-decreasing in total expenditures. Let us brieĘy discuss these three (rather extreme)
speciĕcations:
• First, if all goods are standard goods (n = 0 for all n) then the prices nt are constant and equal to 1
across the different observations t. In this case, the quantitiesQ in the utility function are all multiplied
by 1, which boils down to the classical formulation of the utility function. Differences inmarginal utility
associated with consumption are therefore uniquely driven by differences in the marginal utility of the
intrinsic consumption component, i.e. the quantity denoted by Q. So, when all nt are set to unity,
diamond effects are excluded from the model.
• Second, if there is exactly one diamond good i (such that i = 1 and n = 0 for all n 6= i), the
optimization problem reduces to the model with pure diamond effects by Ng (1987). Indeed, we have
that if Qt maximizes U(tQ); it should also maximize U(P 0it Qi; Qn) and U 0(P itQi; Qn). e ĕnal
step follows from the fact that if Qt solves Problem 1 for some utility function U(:), there will also
exist a utility function U 0(:) such that Q0t =  Qt solves Problem 1, where   is a vector of scalars
which are constant across all t. Otherwise stated, multiplying an argument of the utility function by
a constant scalar (across all t) does not affect the revealed preference results. We effectively obtain a
characterization which is very similar to the model by Ng (1987).
• Finally, if all goods are diamond goods (n = 1 for all n) then the observed consumption vector Qt
maximizes U(P0tQ) and, equivalently, U 0(PtQ). Again, the ĕnal step follows from the fact that utility
functions are not speciĕed, there must only exist one utility function such that Qt solves Problem 1.
ese results are independent of homogeneous transformations (over time t) of some argument in
the utility function. Since Qt maximizes U 0(PtQ), subject to a budget constraint, utility is exclusively
derived from the money spent on commodities.
2.3 Model with mixed diamond effects
emodel, presented in Subsection 2.1, is restrictive in the sense that it is implicitly assumed that there exists
a negative relationship between the responsiveness of normal to market prices on the one hand and the utility
derived from the intrinsic consumption component of commodities on the other hand. In this subsection, we
present a model where utility is (can be) derived from the intrinsic consumption component, irrespective of
the responsiveness of normal tomarket prices, hence irrespective of the diamondness weights n: In this case,
consumers can derive utility both from the intrinsic consumption and from the market-price based value of
commodities.
We therefore introduce the following optimization problem:
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Problem 3 Optimization problem  MDE
max
Q
U(Q; tQ)
s:t:
PtQ  yt
8n 2 N : nt = n  P 0nt + (1  n)  1
Observe, ĕrst of all, that whatever the values of n are, the above optimization problem takes into account
that utility could be derived from the intrinsic consumption component Q. e constraints are identical to
the restrictions in Problem 1.
Next, we deĕne rationalizability withmixed diamond effects in a revealed preference setting.
Deĕnition 4 Consider a data setS = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg:Wesay thatS is rationalizablewithmixed  diamond
effects if there exists a utility function U deĕned over the intrinsic consumption componentQ and the valuation
Q such that fQt; 8t 2 Tg solves optimization problem  MDE.
• Consider ĕrst the scenario where all goods are standard goods (n = 0 for all n). en the prices nt
are constant and equal to one across the different observations t. erefore, utility is only derived from
the intrinsic consumption component Q. Obviously, this all implies that, just as in Subsection 2.1, the
optimization problem coincides with the classical model of utility maximization.
• Next consider a scenario with exactly one (mixed) diamond good i (i = 1 and n = 0 for all n 6=
i). e corresponding optimization problem reduces to the model with mixed diamond effects by
Ng (1993). In this case, both the intrinsic consumption component and the market-price valuation
of commodity i are included in the utility function. Note that if Qt maximizes U(Q; tQ); it will
also maximizeU(Qi; Qn; P 0it Qi; Qn) and, because homogeneous transformations of arguments in the
utility functions do not affect the revealed preference results, U 0(Qi; Qn; P itQi). is speciĕcation
coincides with the model by Ng (1993).
• Finally, if all goods are (mixed) diamond goods, the observed consumption vectorQt maximizes utility
U(Q;P0tQ) and hence U 0(Q;PtQ). Both the intrinsic consumption components of commodities and
their corresponding market values enter the utility function.
3 RP characterizations with diamond effects
In the previous section, we have formulated two models which are more general than the standard utility
maximization model on the one hand, and the models of Ng (1987 and 1993) on the other hand. We have
also deĕned rationalizability in the presence of pure and mixed diamond effects, without imposing too much
structure on the utility functions. Our approach is nonparamatric. In this section, we propose various con-
ditions by which the different rationalizability concepts can be tested. It turns out that these conditions are
linear in all unknowns. ey can therefore be tested by means of appropriate linear programming problems.
3.1 RP characterization with pure diamond effects
First, we develop a test for rationalizability with pure  diamond effects. Hence, we must verify whether
there exists awell-behaved (monotone and concave) and differentiable utility function such that fQt; 8t 2 Tg
8
solves Problem  PDE. Starting from the concavity of the utility function, we have that for all t and v, the
following conditions must hold:
U(tQt)  U(vQv) 
nX @U(vQv)
@nvQ
n
v
(nt Q
n
t   nvQnv )
Next, the ĕrst-order conditions associated with Problem  PDE imply that
@U(tQ)
@nt Q
n
nt = tP
n
t
where t is the strictly positive Lagrange multiplier which is associated with the budget constraint. By
substituting both conditions, and by settingut = U(tQt) anduv = U(vQv), we ĕnally obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 Consider a data set S = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg and suppose that P0t =
Pt
P1
. e following conditions
are equivalent:
1. e data set is rationalizable with pure  diamond effects.
2. For all decision situations t 2 T and for all commodities n 2 N; there exist normal prices t =
(1t ; :::; 
N
t ) 2 RjN j++; numbers ut and (Lagrange) multipliers t 2 R++ such that
ut   uv  v
nX
Pnv /
n
v  (nt Qnt   nvQnv )
8n 2 N : nt = n  P 0nt + (1  n)  1
eProof is in Appendix A. It is easy to verify that the above inequalities reduce to the well-known Afriat
inequalities when all n = 0. By contrast, when all n = 1; a preference ordering which is monotonically
increasing in the total budget yt = PtQt of the consumer can always rationalize data set S. Note that the
inequalities are not linear, because both v and nv are initially unknown. However, by ĕxing the diamond-
ness weights to some value between 0 and 1, we determine the values nv . en the conditions are linear in
the variables ut, uv and v . Of course, the different parameterizations of n will be tested using standard
predictive success measures from the revealed preference literature.
3.2 RP characterization with mixed diamond effects
Second, we develop a test for rationalizability with mixed  diamond effects. We investigate whether it is
possible to construct a well-behaved utility function U , with both values Q and quantities Q as arguments,
such that the observed consumption pattern fQt; 8t 2 Tg solves Problem  MDE. Again, we start from the
concavity of the utility function. For all t and v, we must have that
U(Qt; tQt)  U(Qv; vQv) 
nX @U(Qv; vQv)
@Qnv
(Qnt  Qnv ) +
@U(Qv; vQv)
@nvQ
n
v
(nt Q
n
t   nvQnv )
Moreover, the ĕrst-order conditions, with respect toQ, associated with Problem  MDE imply that
@U(tQ)
@Qn
+
@U(tQ)
@nt Q
n
nt = tP
n
t
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e ĕrst term is the derivative of the utility function with respect to quantity (or intrinsic consumption)
whereas the second term is the derivative of the utility functionwith respect to value (normal pricesmultiplied
by quantities). Of course, these ĕrst-order conditions must hold for all n 2 N . We introduce shadow prices
pnt and Pnt such that pnt = @Ut/@Qnt and Pnt = @Ut/@(nt Qnt ): We also set ut = U(Qt; tQt) and uv =
U(Qv; vQv). en we can formulate our ĕnal proposition.
Proposition 6 Consider a data set S = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg and suppose that P0t =
Pt
P1
. e following conditions
are equivalent:
1. e data set is rationalizable withmixed  diamond effects.
2. For all decision situations t 2 T and for all commodities n 2 N; there exist normal prices t =
(1t ; :::; 
N
t ) 2 RjN j++; numbers ut; (Lagrange) multipliers t 2 R++ and shadow prices pt 2 RjN j++
andPt 2 RjN j++ such that:
ut   uv 
nX
pnv  (Qnt  Qnv ) +
nX
Pnv  (nt Qnt   nvQnv )
8n 2 N : vPnv = pnv +Pnv  nv
8n 2 N : nt = n  P 0nt + (1  n)  1
e Proof is in Appendix B. It is easy to show that, when all n = 0, the inequalities coincide with the
standard Afriat conditions. By contrast, when all n = 1; a preference ordering which is monotonically
increasing in the total budget yt = PtQt of the consumer can always rationalize the data. e conditions
in Proposition 8 are linear in the variables ut; uv; t; pt and Pt for ĕxed values of n. Again, the ‘optimal’
values for n (in terms of predictive success) can be determined by performing a grid search on the intervals
[0; 1].
Note that the above characterization also allows to analyze the consumption of commodities beyond
their point of saturation. e classical model predicts that additional units should not be purchased when a
commodity has become a bad. However, in the presence of diamond effects, it may be rational to purchase
additional units even though the marginal utility associated with the intrinsic consumption component of
some commodity has become negative. A very nice example is discussed in Ng (1993). Suppose I take my
colleagues to a pub. I want to show my appreciation for their fellowship by buying them some drinks. In this
case, the total value associated with offering an additional round is more important than my utility derived
from the intrinsic consumption component of this purchase. It is not unthinkable, aer a point of saturation,
that I am not thirsty anymore and that my marginal utility from consuming an additional unit has become
negative: pv < 0. Still, I am willing to treat my colleagues to an additional round of drinks, because I prefer
to increase the total value of my offer: Pv > 0. If the latter effect (utility increases with total value) outweighs
the former (utility decreases with the consumed quantity aer the saturation point), an equilibrium solution
might effectively be achieved even if themarginal utility of the intrinsic consumption component has become
negative. Summarizing, testing whether a commodity n has become a bad is easy. One can simply add the
requirement
pv < 0
to the revealed preference characterization in Proposition 8.
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3.3 Independence
With diamondness weights n that can take any value between 0 and 1, it is clear that the models with pure
and mixed diamond effects are more general than the classical model. Indeed, the models with pure and
mixed diamond effects encompass the classical model when n is set to 0 for all goods.
In the empirical application, we compare different speciĕcations of the models with pure and mixed di-
amond effects. Each speciĕcation corresponds to the general model (with pure or mixed diamond effects)
where the diamondness weights are ĕxed to a particular set of values. It turns out that these speciĕcations
are independent. Otherwise stated, the speciĕcation where all n are set to 0 (which corresponds to the clas-
sical model) and other speciĕcations with strictly positive diamondness weights for some commodities are
generally non-nested8.
It is possible that a data set violates the predictions of the classical model while the data set is consistent
with the predictions of an alternative model with strictly positive n for some goods. Likewise, it is possible
that a data set is consistent with the classical model while the data set violates the predictions of the alternative
model for some strictly positive values of n. To demonstrate this non-nestedness, we use two examples. e
ĕrst example shows a data set which is not rationalizable when all goods are standard goods but which is
rationalizable when one good is a (pure) diamond good.
Example 7 Consider a data set with T = 2; N = 2; market price vector P =

3 1
1 3

and quantity vector
Q =

3 1
1 3

.
Let us show that this data set violates the standard Afriat inequalities.
[P1Q1 = 10] > [P1Q2 = 6]) u1 > u2
[P2Q2 = 10] > [P2Q1 = 6]) u2 > u1;
a contradiction
e following shows that the data set is consistent with a model where good 1 is a (pure) diamond good
(1 = 1).
[P 11Q
1
1 + P
2
1Q
2
1 = 10] > [P
1
2Q
1
2 + P
2
1Q
2
2 = 4]) u1 > u2
[P 12Q
1
2 + P
2
2Q
2
2 = 10] < [P
1
1Q
1
1 + P
2
2Q
2
1 = 12]; u2 > u1;
we ĕnd no contradiction
e second example shows a data set which is rationalizable when all goods are standard goods but which
is not rationalizable when one good is a (pure) diamond good.
Example 8 Consider a data set with T = 2; N = 3;market price vector P =

1 2 3
4 3 2

and quantity vector
Q =

1 9 10
9 3 0

.
Let us show that this data set is consistent with the standard Afriat inequalities.
[P1Q1 = 49] > [P1Q2 = 15]) u1 > u2
[P2Q2 = 45] < [P2Q1 = 51]; u2 > u1;
we ĕnd no contradiction
8ere is one exception: the speciĕcation where all diamondness weights equal one can never reject rationality. Hence, this
speciĕcation is always weaker than all other speciĕcations.
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e following shows that the data set can not be rationalizedwhen good 2 is a (pure) diamond good (2 = 1).
[P 11Q
1
1 + P
2
1Q
2
1 + P
3
1Q
3
1 = 49] > [P
1
1Q
1
2 + P
2
2Q
2
2 + P
3
1Q
3
2 = 18]) u1 > u2
[P 12Q
1
2 + P
2
2Q
2
2 + P
3
2Q
3
2 = 45] > [P
1
2Q
1
1 + P
2
1Q
2
1 + P
3
2Q
3
1 = 33]) u2 > u1;
a contradiction
4 Data
To test our revealed preference characterizations with and without pure andmixed diamond effects, we make
use of consumer data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, from 1994 to 2006, with the excep-
tion of 1997 and 1999. ese 11 waves correspond to the second collection phase of the RLMS data (Phase
II). To do revealed preference analysis based on these data, we assume that the social environment of the re-
spondents is relatively stable. Remember that revealed preference analysis requires homogeneous preferences
over time. Importantly, we restrict attention to data sets of singles who do not receive any unemployment
beneĕts. Furthermore, we only keep singles which report expenditures for the 11 waves. In this way, we end
up with a sample of 81 singles.
For each person, we have information on the expenditures and the consumed quantities associated with
14 commodity groups9. Note that all commodities are rather nondurable. We exclude ‘big’ decisions on
housing and cars from the data sets. e reason is straightforward: we want to make a clear distinction
between decisions driven by diamond effects on the one hand and intertemporal portfolio decisions on the
other hand. Since the focus of this paper is on the former, we only consider nondurable commodities.
From the (nominal) expenditures and the quantities, it is possible to derive unit prices. Note that these
prices are oen a weighted geometric mean of the prices associated with various detailed subgroups of goods.
For instance, the price of meat is a weighted geometric mean of the prices of beef, pork, organs, poultry, etc.
Furthermore, we use average prices per region and per wave, i.e. it is assumed that singles who are consuming
in the same region and wave face the same prices. Finally, the prices are transformed in order to eliminate the
effects of (hyper)inĘation. As such, we avoid that price changes due to inĘation impact on the consumption
decisions of consumers. e (implicit) assumption that there is no money illusion seems standard in many
studies that involve price-dependent preferences. e transformation of prices does not affect the relative
prices between commodities, which drive revealed preference analysis.
In order to limit the number of diamondness weights to be estimated in the empirical application, we can
further aggregate the 14 commodities into 6 important categories: food at home, vices (alcohol and tobacco),
food outside home, clothing, fuel and luxuries. ese categories can further be divided into two subgroups.
Food at home and fuel can be distinguished from vices, food outside home, clothing and luxuries on the basis
of a visibility ranking, created byHeffetz (2011). To create this ranking, Heffetz (2011) used information from
480 interviews on the visibility of various commodities. e main question in Heffetz’ survey was whether
respondents would notice if another household spent more than average on some commodity (e.g. jewellery
and watches). Respondents were also asked how much time it would take to notice this more-than-average
spending pattern. In this way, the commodities (not brands) which are most visible to society were expected
to obtain a high rank.
Tobacco (ranked 1th), clothing (ranked 3th), jewellery (ranked 5th), food outside home (ranked 7th) and
alcohol (ranked 8th) are all part of the top-10 most visible commodities according to Heffetz’ (2011) ranking.
erefore, we assign these commodities to the ‘visible’ subgroup. Food at home (ranked 14th) and gasoline
(ranked 21th) were ranked considerably lower. ese commodities are collected in the ‘invisible’ subgroup.
We have already argued that diamond effects are conceptually different than status effects. Status effects,
9e commodity groups are similar to the ones considered by Cherchye, De Rock andVermeulen (2009): bread, potatoes, vegeta-
bles, fruit, meat, dairy products, alcohol, tobacco, food outside home, clothes, fuel (car), fuel (wood), fuel (gas) and luxury products.
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on the one hand, imply a very speciĕc interpretation of the effect of prices on preferences. Consumers are
supposed to buy expensive items to ‘show off ’. e deĕnition of diamond effects, on the other hand, is more
general: something is valued for its value rather than for its intrinsic consumption components. One can
not exclude the possibility that consumers want to ‘show off ’ and therefore value the value of commodities.
erefore, we would expect that pure and mixed diamond effects associated with commodities in the visi-
ble subgroup are (somewhat) more outspoken. Our characterizations would thus be empirically supported
if higher diamondness weights for these commodities improved the empirical success of our models. Note
however that there are alternative motivations for modelling diamond effects, which do not rely on con-
spicuous consumption10. Similarly, there may be other interesting visibility measures which capture various
dimensions of the exposure of commodities to society. e following results should thus be interpreted with
care. e main purpose of this empirical application is to show how the revealed preference measures are
affected by the assumptions on the diamondness of different commodities. Revealed preference measures
are presented in the next section.
5 Empirical performance
In order to assess the empirical success of the different characterizations, we refer to some measures which
are commonly used in revealed preference analysis. Speciĕcally, we focus on pass rates, power and predictive
success of the various models.
Pass rates An attractive feature of the revealed preference framework is that each consumer can be analyzed
separately. Otherwise stated, we can run an independent test for the rationality of each consumer, in the
presence or absence of pure or mixed diamond effects. In this way, we have 81 responses which can either
be equal to 1 (then the individual’s behaviour can be rationalized by some well-behaved utility function) or
0 (then the individual’s behaviour can not be rationalized by a utility function) for some speciĕcation of the
diamondness weight. By computing the average response, we obtain one possible measure for the empirical
performance of our models: the pass rate. Hence, if the pass rate equals 1, then each of the 81 individuals
has chosen consistently with the speciĕed model. A pass rate of 0 would indicate that no agent is rational
according to the model.
Power Given that it is our purpose to compare characterizations with different diamondness weights, we
also need to apply a measure for the meaningfulness of our models. It is easy to show why such measure
is necessary. A characterization where all diamondness weights are set to 1 would impose no meaningful
restrictions on our data sets. In such case, the normal prices (Pollak, 1977) coincide with the market prices
for all commodities. Bilancini (2011) and Frank and Nagler (2012) have rightfully argued that revealed pref-
erence theory is useless when preferences as well as the budget sets are driven by the market prices. Any
pattern of choices can trivially satisfy the revealed preference conditions. Moreover, even if normal prices
and market prices do not co-move exactly, the power of our models can be inĘuenced by the choice of the
diamondness weights.
In order to control for this issue, we compute the power associated with different speciĕcations of the
models. Speciĕcally, we construct data sets by simulation, and test whether these randomly generated data
sets satisfy the revealed preference conditions associated with the models. Discriminatory power is then one
minus the average pass rate of random data sets. Indeed, the nonparametric conditions should enable us to
reject rationality for random, inconsistent choices.
10As Ng (1987) argues, a man may offer an expensive ring to his wife, but they may never show this ring to society. is excludes
status effects. However, even in this case, the visibility of the ring matters within the household.
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While simulating randomdata sets, we still use some information on the actual choices of singles. Indeed,
for each consumer and for each wave, we simulate a new set of budget shares (spent on the 19 commodities)
by drawing one set from the distribution of observed sets of budget shares in the sample11. ese budget
shares are thenmultiplied by the budget associated with the respective consumer and wave, in order to create
new commodity bundles. In this way, we create 8100 random data sets. An attractive feature of this so called
bootstrap procedure is that the newly generated data sets still reĘect a minimal amount of realism. However,
since the different choices within one simulated data set do not come from the same individual with identical
preferences, these data sets should not satisfy the conditions of our models.
Predictive success In the end, wewant to decide onwhich speciĕcation ismost attractive in terms of empir-
ical performance, since different characterizations correspond to different diamondness weights. erefore,
we apply the measure of predictive success, proposed by Selten (1991) and discussed in more detail by Beatty
and Crawford (2011). An elegant feature of this measure is that it combines pass rates (PR) and discrimina-
tory power (POWER). Predictive success (PS) is deĕned as:
PS = PR+ POWER  1
Higher predictive success indicates that the model is better able to distinguish between observed be-
haviour (which is supposed to be rational according to the model) and random, simulated behaviour (which
is supposed to violate the conditions of the model). Hence, a predictive success of 1 would suggest that each
observed data set is consistent with the model whereas each random data set violates the conditions of the
model. A predictive success of -1 is the worst possible outcome, while a predictive success of 0 would imply
that the model cannot discriminate between real and random data sets. e more positive predictive success
scores are hence desirable.
6 Results
In this section, we ĕrst report the standard pass rates, power and predictive success measures for various
speciĕcations of the diamondness weights. We studywhether giving higher diamondness weights to themore
visible commodities also leads to an improvement of the empirical performance of the economic models. In
a further step, we examine the extent to which each individual is behaving consistently with the models while
speciĕcally focusing on the time dimension. We also verify whether there is much heterogeneity in the value
seeking behaviour of our respondents. Finally, we investigate the heterogeneity in diamondness for the six
commodity groups: food at home, vices, food outside home, clothing, fuel and luxuries.
6.1 Pass rates, Power, Predictive success
Table 1 presents the pass rates and power estimates (between brackets) associated with different speciĕcations
of themodel with pure diamond effects (PDE).e rows represent different values of the diamondness weight
associated with food at home and fuel, the columns represent different values of the diamondness weight
associated with vices, food outside home, clothing and luxury commodities. A more detailed decomposition
of diamondness weights is provided in Subsection 6.4. Remember that, when one particular diamondness
weight equals 0, the respective commodity is valued for its intrinsic consumption component only. When,
on the other hand, the diamondness weight equals 1, the commodity is speciĕcally valued for its value.
eupper le result in Table 1 corresponds to the classical utilitymaximizationmodel which can be tested
using the GARP (Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference). e behaviour of about 58 per cent of the
11is approach refers to the so called bootstrap power calculation, discussed in Andreoni and Harbaugh, 2006.
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visible goods
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
less visible goods
0 0.580 0.605 0.630 0.630 0.667
(0.491) (0.484) (0.476) (0.470) (0.468)
0.25 0.630 0.642 0.679 0.679 0.716
(0.442) (0.430) (0.420) (0.409) (0.404)
0.5 0.716 0.716 0.741 0.765 0.802
(0.375) (0.358) (0.341) (0.325) (0.314)
0.75 0.741 0.753 0.778 0.790 0.852
(0.288) (0.260) (0.233) (0.206) (0.188)
1 0.852 0.864 0.889 0.914 1
(0.184) (0.145) (0.106) (0.061) (0)
Table 1: Pass rates (and power) for individuals, pure diamond effects
consumers can be rationalized by a classical well-behaved utility function. e lower right result corresponds
to the model where all normal and market prices coincide. Not surprisingly, this revealed preference model
imposes no testable restrictions, as a result of which all data sets are rationalized. e other cells are more
interesting. By varying the diamondness weights, very different pass rates and power estimates are obtained.
visible goods
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
less visible goods
0 0.580 0.617 0.642 0.679 0.741
(0.491) (0.474) (0.457) (0.439) (0.424)
0.25 0.753 0.778 0.815 0.852 0.914
(0.373) (0.351) (0.332) (0.311) (0.294)
0.5 0.827 0.840 0.864 0.914 0.938
(0.237) (0.214) (0.193) (0.173) (0.153)
0.75 0.889 0.901 0.938 0.951 0.988
(0.118) (0.093) (0.070) (0.053) (0.040)
1 0.914 0.938 0.963 0.975 1
(0.058) (0.036) (0.017) (0.005) (0)
Table 2: Pass rates (and power) for individuals, mixed diamond effects
Table 2 presents the pass rates and power estimates (between brackets) associated with different speciĕ-
cations of the model with mixed diamond effects (MDE). According to this model, preferences are always (at
least) deĕned over an intrinsic consumption component. Depending on the responsiveness of normal prices
to market prices (captured by the diamondness weight), value is also taken into account. Similar to Table 1,
we observe that the results in the upper le cell coincide with the results of a classical GARP check, whereas
the results in the lower right cell reĘect the non-testability of the speciĕcation. In general, the pass rates in
Table 2 are higher than the pass rates in Table 1.
is is explained by the fact that MDE speciĕcations impose less structure on the utility functions. In-
deed, even if normal prices coincide with market prices such that utility is derived from the market value of
commodities, utility can still be derived from intrinsic consumption components as well.
e results of Tables 1 and 2 are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 in terms of predictive success. On the basis
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visible goods
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
less visible goods
0 0.071 0.089 0.106 0.099 0.134
0.25 0.072 0.072 0.099 0.088 0.120
0.5 0.091 0.074 0.082 0.091 0.116
0.75 0.029 0.013 0.011 -0.004 0.039
1 0.035 0.009 -0.005 -0.025 0
Table 3: Predictive success, individuals, pure diamond effects
visible goods
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
less visible goods
0 0.071 0.091 0.099 0.118 0.165
0.25 0.126 0.129 0.147 0.163 0.208
0.5 0.064 0.054 0.057 0.086 0.091
0.75 0.007 -0.006 0.008 0.003 0.028
1 -0.029 -0.025 -0.020 -0.020 0
Table 4: Predictive success, individuals, mixed diamond effects
of these tables, one can study which speciĕcations are empirically supported and which speciĕcations seem
more or less unrealistic. In Table 3, the highest predictive success is observed when the diamondness weight
associated with food at home and fuel amounts to 0 and the diamondness weight associated with vices, food
outside home, clothing and luxury products amounts to 1. In Table 4, the speciĕcationwith highest predictive
success is where the diamondness weight associated with food at home and fuel is 0.25 and the diamondness
weight associated with vices, food outside home, clothing and luxury products amounts to 1. Note that, in
line with the MDE model, the 0.25-diamondness of food (at home) and fuel does not preclude that utility is
derived from the intrinsic consumption of food and fuel.
eĕgures in Tables 3 and 4 show clearly that the classicalmodel of individual rationality can be improved
in terms of predictive success by allowing for pure (improvement by 0.063) and/or mixed (improvement by
0.137) diamond effects. Furthermore, onewould be tempted to conclude that especially themore visible com-
modity groups should get higher diamondness weights, in order to enhance the predictive success. Starting
from a maximum predictive success of 0.134 (PDE) or 0.208 (MDE), it seems that giving higher diamond-
ness weights to invisible commodities and lower diamondness weights to visible commodities decreases the
predictive success of the models. e highest predictive success scores are situated in the upper right sec-
tors, where food at home and fuel are assumed to have little diamondness and vices, food outside the house,
clothing and luxuries are assumed to have considerable diamondness. Finally, the empirical support for the
characterizations with mixed diamond effects is somewhat stronger.
One should be careful to draw important conclusions though. First of all, the selected sample includes
only 81 consumers. Second, in the immediate neighbourhood of the upper le cell (corresponding to the
classical model) in Table 3, there are only minor changes in predictive success as we allow for diamond ef-
fects associated with visible or invisible commodities. However, increasing the diamondness weight of food
and fuel by a large number seems to deteriorate empirical performance whereas increasing the diamondness
weight of vices, food outside home, clothing and luxuries by a large number seems to improve empirical
performance.
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6.2 Goodness-of-ĕt
In this paragraph, we provide additional information on the goodness-of-ĕt of the above speciĕcations. e
previously reported pass rates give insight into the ĕt between the speciĕcations on the one hand and the 81
data sets on the other hand. However, pass rates are robust measures of goodness-of-ĕt. It remains unknown
to what extent each individual consumer behaves consistently with a model, the test only reports 1 (fully
rational) or 0 (not rational) per consumer.
erefore, in Table 5, we report the largest subset of subsequent time periods duringwhich each consumer
behaves in line with some speciĕcation. For instance, it is possible that a consumer, albeit not fully consistent
with some model, behaves consistently with the model during 10 out of 11 waves. Note that Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen (2009) and Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003) also report on the largest number
of continuous subperiods satisfying a (revealed preference) test of individual rationality.
individual rationality mean std dev min max
with lessvis = 0 and vis = 0 9.9136 1.5427 5 11
with lessvis = 0 and vis = 1, pure 10.2222 1.3229 6 11
with lessvis = 0:25 and vis = 1, mixed 10.7901 0.7861 6 11
Table 5: Goodness-of-ĕt summary statistics, individuals
For reasons of clarity, we only compare three characterizations: 1) the classical model of utility maxi-
mization, 2) the PDE speciĕcation which has the highest predictive success in Table 3 and ĕnally 3) the MDE
speciĕcation which has the highest predictive success in Table 4. On average, consumers behave consistently
with the classical model during 9.9136 periods. e length of this time period can be increased to 10.2222
when considering pure diamond effects and even 10.7901 when considering mixed diamond effects. e
introduction of diamond effects also implies that there are no longer consumers whose choices can not be
rationalized for at least 6 periods.
Although this gives more detailed information on the rationality of consumers, onemust be careful when
comparing the different characterizations on the basis of this information, for we did not take discriminatory
power of the models into account in this paragraph.
6.3 Distribution of predictive success
One of the attractive features of the revealed preference methodology is that it allows us to test the rationality
of different consumers independently of one another. As such, we can take into account that consumers are
heterogeneous in terms of preferences. It is, for instance, not unthinkable that different consumers attribute
different diamondness to the same commodity. One particular model can be successful in describing the
choices of one consumer while it is unsuccessful in describing the choices of another consumer. erefore,
mean predictive success scores are not fully informative.
In this paragraph, we discuss the predictive success of different speciĕcations for each consumer sep-
arately. Table 6 presents the distribution of the predictive success measure across our sample. We report
predictive success quartiles for the three characterizations discussed in the previous paragraph: 1) the classi-
cal model, 2) the best PDE speciĕcation (in terms of average predictive success, see Table 3) and 3) the best
MDE speciĕcation (in terms of average predictive success, see Table 4).
Before analyzing the results, we see that the median value across the sample, for all speciĕcations, is posi-
tive. Positive predictive success implies that a speciĕcation is able to distinguish between random (irrational)
behaviour and observed (rational) behaviour. We ĕnd that the observed choices of at least 50 per cent of the
consumers in our sample can be described (and empirically distinguished from random behaviour) by our
speciĕcations.
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individual rationality min ĕrst quartile median third quartile max
with lessvis = 0 and vis = 0 -0.69 -0.3925 0.16 0.4525 0.82
with lessvis = 0 and vis = 1, pure -0.7 -0.2725 0.31 0.4425 0.84
with lessvis = 0:25 and vis = 1, mixed -0.84 0.1475 0.26 0.4025 0.66
Table 6: Distribution of predictive success
Figure 1: Predictive success distribution for different models
e most apparent ĕnding in Table 6 pertains to the ĕrst quartile. e ĕrst quartile of the predictive
success distribution is negative both for the classical model and for the PDE speciĕcation. For the MDE
speciĕcation, on the other hand, the ĕrst quartile is about 0.1475. is implies that the decisions of at least
75 per cent of the respondents in our sample can be described rather well. Figure 1 depicts the empirical
(cumulative) distributions of the predictive success associated with the classical model, the PDE speciĕcation
and the MDE speciĕcation under consideration.
From the graph, it can be seen that the classical model has some difficulties in discriminating between
real observed choices and random simulated choices. e predictive success associated with the classical
model is only positive for about one half of the consumers. By contrast, the predictive success associated with
the MDE speciĕcation is positive for up to 90 per cent of the respondents. is provides strong empirical
support for the case of mixed diamond effects. Moreover, we see that the MDE speciĕcation is more likely
to obtain positive predictive success scores than the PDE speciĕcation. Summarizing, the theoretically more
general model with mixed diamond effects is also empirically supported: it describes the choices of many
more respondents while it is only slightly more likely to describe random or simulated choices.
Note that we have also recovered different diamondness weights per individual, in order to link individual
perceptions of diamondness to individual characteristics, such as age, gender and income. Althoughwe found
considerable heterogeneity in diamondness values across the sample, we could not detect signiĕcant statistical
relationships. is could be due to the relatively small sample size, or to the fact that the results are mainly
driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
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Figure 2: Predictive success in function of diamondness per commodity (benchmark = best performing spec-
iĕcation with mixed diamond effects)
6.4 Diamondness per commodity
Up to now, we have identiĕed aggregate diamondness weights for the visible and less visible group of com-
modities. We ĕnally go one step further by splitting these subgroups back up in food at home, fuel, vices, food
away from home, clothing and luxuries. Per product, we will analyze the evolution of the predictive success
measure in function of the commodity’s perceived diamondness weight.
It is important to note that we use the best performing speciĕcation in Table 4 (mixed diamond effects)
as the benchmark. Because we aim at analyzing the diamondness of each commodity separately, we ĕx
the diamondness of the other commodities to the values which correspond to the benchmark speciĕcation
(lessvis = 0:25 and vis = 1). For robustness, we repeat this exercise in Appendix C for an alternative
benchmark12.
e following table summarizes predictive success for different values of the diamondness weights.
Clearly, there is considerable heterogeneity in the evolution of the predictive success across the different
commodities. First of all, it is conĕrmed that giving high diamondness weights to the less visible goods -
food consumption at home and fuel - is detrimental to the empirical performance of the model. Increasing the
postulated diamondness of fuel and food consumed at home (more than food = 0:2) leads to a substantial
decrease in the estimated predictive success. Interestingly, the predictive success reacts differently to the
diamondness of food consumption away from home. ere seems to be a positive relationship between the
predictive success of some speciĕcation and the postulated diamondness of restaurant visits.
Second, predictive success is increasing in the postulated diamondness of clothes and vices (alcohol and
tobacco), although the relationship between empirical performance on the one hand and postulated dia-
mondness on the other hand appears to be volatile. e predictive success initially decreases as higher dia-
12In Appendix C, we no longer compare our results based on the best performing speciĕcation in Table 4. Instead, we compare
our results on the basis of the classical model. is means that the evolution of the predictive success in function of the diamondness
of one product is analyzed when the diamondness of all other products is (assumed to be) 0.
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mondness is attributed to alcohol and tobacco (a minimum is reached at vices = 0:7). However, one can
observe a steep increase in predictive success aer this point. It is not unthinkable that there are two kinds
of people when it comes to vices: people who only care for the intrinsic consumption component of alcohol
and tobacco (possibly addicted consumers - a habits model could be used to distinguish these people) and
on the other hand people who appreciate expensive wine/beers/cigares for their value, etc.
Finally, note that the predictive success in function of the diamondness of luxuries remains more or less
constant across all possible values of the diamondness weight. Only the case where lux = 0 has a somewhat
lower predictive success.
Summarizing, these more reĕned results seem to conĕrm what was found in Subsection 6.1: the reac-
tion of predictive success to changes in the diamondness parameters clearly depends on the goods under
consideration. Different commodities do not necessarily have the same degree of diamondness.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an easily testable (revealed preference) model for rational consumption in the pres-
ence or absence of diamond effects. In this way, we try to incorporate psychological insights into economic
modelling. Ourmodel is general in the sense that both the classical utilitymaximizationmodel, themodels of
Ng (1987 and 1993) - where only one of the commodities is a so-called diamond good - and the model which
loses its testable implications because the preferences depend on the market prices of all commodities, are
different speciĕcations of the same underlying model. is general model can easily be modiĕed to capture
pure diamond effects (high responsiveness of normal to market prices excludes that utility is derived from
intrinsic consumption) and mixed diamond effects (normal prices can be very responsive to market prices
while utility is still derived from the intrinsic consumption component as well).
From an empirical perspective, we make use of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS)
which provides data on various consumption choices. e commodities are heterogeneous in terms of visi-
bility to society. Clothing and luxuries, for instance, are more visible commodities than food at home or fuel.
By using the empirical success (taking into account both pass rates and discriminatory power) of a model as
a criterion, we are able to identify the speciĕcation which describes reality most accurately. Different speci-
ĕcations of a model are pinned down using a set of diamondness weights, which deĕne the extent to which
the arguments entering the utility functions of consumers depend on the market prices of commodities.
Our results suggest that, in general, the predictive success associated with the classical model of utility
maximization can be improved by increasing the diamondweights of themore visible commodities. First, this
suggests that incorporating diamond effects into models of rationality improves the empirical performance
of themodels. Second, in line with Heffetz (2011), it is conĕrmed that themore visible commodities aremore
likely to trigger diamond (status) effects.
Future research could focus on the following extensions. First of all, although our results based on a small
sample are already quite interesting, it would be better to test the aforementioned models using larger data
sets. Second, to distinguish the diamond effects (Ng, 1987 and 1993) from status effects (Veblen, 1899) and
quality effects (Scitovsky, 1945), one should control for the budget sets of other consumers in society and con-
trol for the quality of the commodities. ird, although we are able to identify sets of diamondness weights
which satisfy the rationality criterion, it is difficult to pin down an exact value for the diamondness parameter
associated with some individual. Finally, future research could also concentrate on integrating the diamond
effects in revealed preference models of collective consumption. In collective settings, e.g. household de-
cisions, various other factors (such as the love between two partners) may affect consumption of diamond
goods.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof.
• We ĕrst prove that condition 1 implies condition 2. Consider the following (necessary) ĕrst-order
condition for the optimization of PDE:
UnQn  n  Pn;
where UnQn is a subderivative of the (concave) utility function with respect to nQn. Concavity of
the utility function gives:
ut   uv 
nX
UnQn;v  (nt Qnt   nvQnv );
Substituting UnQn;v by means of the ĕrst-order condition ĕnally yields:
ut   uv  v
nX
Pnv /
n
v  (nt Qnt   nvQnv );
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• We then prove that condition 2 implies condition 1.
We start from the observation that
U(Q)  Uv + v
nX
Pnv /
n
v  (nQn   nvQnv );
In a following step, we select the minimum of all overestimates:
U(Q) = min
v
(Uv + v
nX
Pnv /
n
v  (nQn   nvQnv ));
is formulation should be such that any (tQ); for which PtQt  PtQ; implies that U(tQt) 
U(tQ):
First, it is important to understand that U(vQv) = Uv for v = 1; :::; T: Indeed, for some t, we have
that
U(vQv) = Ut + t
nX
Pnt /
n
t  (nvQnv   nt Qnt )
 Uv + v
nX
Pnv /
n
v  (nvQnv   nvQnv ) = Uv
If this inequality were strict, we would have that
Uv   Ut > t
nX
Pnt /
n
t  (nvQnv   nt Qnt )
which contradicts the Afriat inequalities. Hence U(vQv) = Uv:
Second, any (tQ) for which PtQt  PtQmust be consistent with
U(tQ) = min
v
(Uv + v
nX
Pnv /
n
v  (nt Qn   nvQnv ))
 Ut + t
nX
Pnt /
n
t  (nt Qn   nt Qnt )  Ut = U(tQt)
e ĕrst inequality follows from the deĕnition of U(tQ); the second inequality follows from
t
nX
Pnt /
n
t  (nt Qn   nt Qnt )  0
) t
nX
Pnt  (Qn  Qnt )  0
A.2 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof.
• We ĕrst prove that condition 1 implies condition 2. Consider the following (necessary) ĕrst-order
condition for the optimization of MDE:
UQn + UnQn  nt  Pnt ;
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whereUQn andUnQn are subderivatives of the (concave) utility functionwith respect toQn and nQn;
respectively. Concavity of the utility function gives:
ut   uv  UQn;v  (Qnt  Qnv ) +
nX
UnQn;v  (nt Qnt   nvQnv );
Finally, we replace pnv = UQn;v andPnv = [Pnt   UQn;v]/nt such thatPnv  UnQn;v:
ut   uv 
nX
pnv  (Qnt  Qnv ) +
nX
Pnv  (nt Qnt   nvQnv );
vP
n
v = p
n
v +P
n
v  nv 8n 2 N ;
• We then prove that condition 2 implies condition 1 (based on Varian, 1982).
We start from the observation that
U(Q; Q)  Uv +
nX
pnv  (Qn  Qnv ) +
nX
Pnv  (nQn   nvQnv );
In a following step, we select the minimum of all overestimates:
U(Q; Q) = min
v
(Uv +
nX
pnv  (Qn  Qnv ) +
nX
Pnv  (nQn   nvQnv ));
is formulation should be such that any (Q; tQ); for whichPtQt  PtQ; implies thatU(Qt; tQt) 
U(Q; tQ):
First, it is important to understand that U(Qv; vQv) = Uv for v = 1; :::; T: Indeed, for some t, we
have that
U(Qv; vQv) = Ut +
nX
pnv  (Qnv  Qnt ) +
nX
Pnv  (nvQnv   nt Qnt )
 Uv +
nX
pnv  (Qnv  Qnv ) +
nX
Pnv  (nvQnv   nvQnv )
= Uv
If this inequality were strict, we would have that
Uv   Ut >
nX
pnv  (Qnv  Qnt ) +
nX
Pnv  (nvQnv   nt Qnt )
which contradicts the Afriat inequalities. Hence U(Qv; vQv) = Uv:
Second, any (Q; tQ) for which PtQt  PtQmust be consistent with
U(Q; tQ) = min
v
(Uv +
nX
pnv  (Qn  Qnv ) +
nX
Pnv  (nt Qn   nvQnv ))
 Ut +
nX
pnv  (Qn  Qnt ) +
nX
Pnv  (nt Qn   nt Qnt )
 Ut = U(Qt; tQt)
e ĕrst inequality follows from the deĕnition of U(Q; tQ); the second inequality follows from
Ut +
nX
pnv  (Qn  Qnt ) +
nX
Pnv  (nt Qn   nt Qnt )
= Ut +
nX
(tP
n
t   @Ut/@(nt Qnt )  nt )  (Qn  Qnt ) +
nX
Pnv  (nt Qn   nt Qnt )
= Ut + t
nX
Pnt  (Qn  Qnt )
 Ut
24
B General and nonlinear normal price function
In this appendix, we allow for a more general normal price function n0t = (Pn1 ; :::; Pnt ). First of all, the
normal prices can depend on themarket prices in the current period and in all observed past periods. Second,
the relationship between normal prices and market prices is no longer linear. Hence, the responsiveness of
normal to market prices, and hence the diamondness weights, are no longer required to be constant.
Deĕnition 9 e normal price n0t of commodity n in observation t is a function of all market prices Pnv of
commodity n such that v  t. is function is
1. non-decreasing in all Pnv ;
2. homogeneous of degree 1 in all Pnv .
e diamondness per commodity and per observation is then given by a vector n = rPn(Pn1 ; :::; Pnt ).
It can easily be seen that all our propositions remain valid. e only difference is the speciĕcation of the
normal price function. e linear expression is now replaced by amore general function n0t = (Pn1 ; :::; Pnt )
which is, yet, restricted by the above conditions. Note that the innovation associated with the introduction of
this general normal price function is not limited to the non-linear relationship between normal and market
prices. It is also reĘected in the number of (past) periods which impact on the normal prices.
Suppose one imposes a linear normal price functionwhich depends onmarket prices in the current period
and in all observed past periods: n0t = n0  Pnt + :::+ nt 1  Pn1 . en n0 is the immediate responsiveness
of normal to market prices, whereas nt 1 is the responsiveness of normal to market prices delayed by t   1
periods. In this way, the model can also deal with situations where different goods have different memory
coefficients, as discussed by Pollak (1977). Indeed, the normal prices of some commodities may be more
sensitive tomarket prices in the recent past whereas the normal prices of other goodsmay bemore dependent
on the market prices of earlier periods.
C Diamondness per commodity: robustness
To obtain more (robust) insight into the diamondness of different commodity groups, we also analyze the
evolution of predictive success in function of the diamondness of some commodity, while assuming that the
diamondness of all other commodity groups is 0. Previously, we used an ‘optimal’ benchmark, where the
diamondness of the other commodities was taken from the scenario with highest predictive success in Table
4.
Figure 3 presents the evolution of predictive success in function of the diamondness of some commodity,
with the classical model of utility maximization as the benchmark.
Most of our earlier conclusions remain valid. e predictive success decreases as the diamondness of fuel
is increased or when the diamondness of food consumption at home is increased more than 0.2. Moroever,
the predictive success increases as the diamondness of clothes, vices and food consumption away from home is
raised. e predictive success is rather insensitive to changes in the diamondness of luxuries.
Interestingly, Figure 3 also conĕrms that, according to the model with mixed diamond effects, the dia-
mondness of food consumed at home is not exactly 0. is was also observed in the predictive success results
of Table 4.
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Figure 3: Predictive success in function of diamondness per commodity (benchmark = classical model)
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